Chapter 5: The Occidental Discourse of Abdul Al-Rahman Al-Kawakibi

In this chapter, I will set forth the Occidental views of Abdul Rahman Al-Kawakibi (1854–1902), who is considered to be one of the main founders of Arab nationalism. Kawakibi is also remembered for his writings against authoritarianism and tyranny, which still inspire many pro-democracy advocates in the Arab world today.

Kawakibi’s life and writings, as I will explain later in detail, were motivated by his strong anti-Ottoman attitudes. The Ottomans jailed Kawakibi twice and forced him to leave his native country, Syria, for Egypt, where he was protected by Egypt’s ruler, Abbas Helmi, who was in disagreement with the Ottomans. In addition, Kawakibi was occupied with reform and how it should be achieved. In this regard, Kawakibi was interested in reforming Muslims’ religious and political thinking. He saw reform as a long-term gradual process and did not believe that his contemporary Arab societies were ready to change their circumstances dramatically. He also thought that reformers should avoid severely criticizing the masses and avoid showing disrespect to the masses’ habits and traditions in order to win them to their side. These circumstances and views, I argue throughout this chapter, led Kawakibi to pay less attention to criticizing Western colonialism and its negative effects on Arab and Muslim societies, to praise Europe as a model for reform of political and civil society, but to criticize the West at the social and religious levels.

I start this chapter with a brief introduction to Kawakibi’s life and main ideas regarding reform. Then, I analyze Kawakibi’s view of the West in general and of America in particular. I will also examine the role of religion in Kawakibi’s Occidental views. I end the chapter by summarizing the main characteristics of Kawakibi’s Occidental discourse.

1) Kawakibi’s Life

Abdul Rahman Al-Kawakibi was born in 1854 to an aristocratic Syrian family. He worked as a judge, published two newspapers, and was a successful businessman. He was also a known political activist, who enjoyed wide public support. When the Ottomans jailed Kawakibi in 1886, because of his critical political views, they were forced to free him after the public spontaneously rose in his support (Imarah 1975:22). Yet, because of Kawakibi’s continuous opposition and criticism of the Ottomans, he was jailed a second time, his newspapers were banned, and he lost his business. In 1899 Kawakibi migrated to Egypt after the Ottomans put tremendous political and economic pressures on him. In Egypt, Kawakibi gained a wide reputation and was supported by Egypt’s ruler, Abbas Helmi, who was in conflict and disagreement with the Ottoman Empire. In 1902 Kawakibi passed away after he was poisoned.

Kawakibi’s life and main writings were shaped by his negative experience with the Ottomans, who forced him to leave his country, Syria, and flee to Egypt. In response, Kawakibi devoted his life and writings to two main ideas, Arab nationalism and freedom, which the Ottomans disliked. The first idea, Arab nationalism, ran contrary to the pan-Islamic notions that the Ottomans spread in the Muslim world in the second half of the nineteenth century, trying to use religion to strengthen their status as the caliphs of the Muslim world against the incursions of European colonialism. Yet the Ottomans, who were bad colonizers, as Jamal Al-Din Al-Afghani described them, failed to win Arabs to their side. Christian Arab intellectuals were the first to promote Arab nationalism as an alternative to the Ottomans’ pan-Islamic notions. In this regard, Kawakibi was remembered to be the first main Muslim intellectual to champion the cause of Arab nationalism.

Kawakibi’s Arab nationalistic ideas were highlighted in one of the two main books that he left, titled Umm Al-Qura or The Mother of Cities. In Umm Al-Qura, Kawakibi wrote about an imaginary international conference of Muslim scholars held in Mecca, the mother of cities, to analyze the root causes of Muslims’ decline and to look for solutions to those problems. The book was full of useful analytical ideas about the status of Muslim societies at Kawakibi’s time and the reasons for their decline. The book ended with a strong appeal for two main initiatives. First, it called for establishing an international non-governmental organization of Muslim scholars that should work on reforming Muslims’ ways of thinking and Islamic educational systems. Second, Kawakibi believed that this organization should be based temporarily in Egypt and ultimately in Mecca because Arabs were the founders of the Muslim civilization and were more trustworthy when it came to caring for Islam and Muslims. He also launched a severe attack on the Ottomans, whom he described as traitors, willing to align themselves with non-Muslim European nations against other Muslim nations, such as the Muslim states in Spain and North Africa, in order to achieve their political interests. He ended his book with a clear appeal for replacing the Ottoman Empire with a righteous Arab caliphate.

The second main cause that Kawakibi championed in his writings was the cause of spreading freedom and fighting tyranny in the Arab world. In the second book that Kawakibi wrote, titled Tabaee Al-Istebdad or The Characteristics of Tyranny, he described eloquently and in detail the various characteristics of tyrannical regimes. He also spoke about how tyrannical rulers inject tyranny and authoritarianism into all aspects of life in their societies. He spoke about the negative effects of tyranny on ethics, economy, freedoms, education, and several other aspects of social life. The clarity and strength of Kawakibi’s arguments in Tabaee Al-Istebdad made it an inspiring book for pro-freedom and democracy advocates in the Arab world until today. For example, Kawakibi’s writings were widely discussed and honored after the fall and capture of the former Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein. At that time, several Arabic intellectuals remembered and praised Kawakibi for his special ability to correctly describe the nature of authoritarian regimes in the Arab world (Jelbi 2003; Dajani 2004).

2) Kawakibi’s View of Reform

The main goal of Kawakibi’s writings was to analyze the conditions of his contemporary Muslim societies and to prescribe solutions for their problems. In this regard, Kawakibi focused on reforming the political and religious thinking of his contemporary Muslims. His experience led him to feel that reform is hard to bring to Arab and Muslims societies. He believed that Arabs and Muslim didn’t have alternatives to their tyrannical rulers. So he thought that change and reform could only happen slowly and by educating the new Arab and Muslim generations. On the other hand, Kawakibi, as a political thinker who enjoyed wide public support, understood the need not to offend the masses. He thought that reformers and political leaders should avoid criticizing the masses too much and should also show all respect to the masses’ habits and traditions, even if they were “silly” (Tahan 2003:212).

The captives of tyranny, even the rich among them, are miserable. …They live with weak intellect, weak feelings, and weak ethics. It is very unjust to blame them for anything but to provide them with mercy and guidance. They are similar, in their circumstances, to insects that live under rocks. It is only proper for the critics to be merciful. (Tahan 2003:172)

In this regard, Kawakibi held pessimistic views about human nature in general. “Human[s],” Kawakibi believed (Tahan 2003:153), “are closer to evil than to goodness.” He also saw the masses as more a part of the problem than of the solution and complained about how some segments of the Muslim masses became used to tyranny and to oppression to the extent that they hated change and fought reform and reformers.

We admit that some of us became used to a thousand years of tyranny, oppression, humiliation, and weakness. So humiliation became one of their tempers, which they will feel pain if they give up. This is the reason why the great majority of Egyptians, Indians, and Tunisians, who got, despite their wishes, some security for their souls and wealth and some freedoms in their ideas and actions, don’t feel sorry and don’t feel sad for the conditions of Muslims who live in other countries. In contrast, they look angrily at those who oppose their Muslim rulers. And they may consider reformers as heretics. (Tahan 2002:59-60)

In addition to his pessimism about the role of the masses in reform, Kawakibi preferred gradual change and did not support revolutions or other forms of rapid or radical transformation. He saw change as a long-term process. He thought that reformers should focus on educating the intellectual and political elites rather than on mobilizing the masses. When he called for establishing an international non-governmental organization for Muslim scholars, he believed that this organization “should not intervene in the political affairs at all” (Tahan 2002:182). He also thought that “the goal of the association is limited to achieving religious reform and … that political organization would follow religion” (Tahan 2002:203).

In this context, Kawakibi urged Muslims to look inside their societies and to seek to understand the internal causes for their decline in order to fix them. He believed that the decline of Muslims was the result of three main internal problems that had many roots and manifestations: misunderstanding of the Islamic religion by the Muslim scholars and masses, the political tyranny of Muslim rulers, and the corruption of the ethics of his contemporary Muslim masses (Tahan 2002:154-157).

When it came to misunderstanding Islam, Kawakibi criticized his contemporary Muslim scholars of mimicking the great old Muslim scholars without trying to understand the methodology they used to analyze Islamic rules and to apply them to their lives. This lazy imitation led recent Muslim scholars, according to Kawakibi, to overburden the Muslims masses with too many Islamic rules that the masses could neither understand nor apply in their daily lives.

When it came to political tyranny, Kawakibi was very critical of Muslim rulers in general and of the Ottomans in particular. He believed that the Muslim regimes had become unrestricted kingdoms, in which the rulers were free from any responsibility or political constraints. He complained about the lack of freedom, security, hope, justice, and equality in Muslim societies. He believed that tyrannical Muslim rulers fought knowledge and knowledgeable people and elevated the status of pseudo-scholars who were loyal to them. He thought that Muslim rulers had manipulated religion, had used Islam to justify their tyranny, and had corrupted the ethics of the Muslim masses.

He believed that the Ottomans were very bad governors, who led a very centralized empire and who intentionally divided Muslims to control them. He believed that the Ottomans deliberately appointed bad rulers, who were inefficient and who were hated by the Muslim countries they ruled, in order to be sure that the local masses would never unite with their appointed rulers against the Ottoman Empire. He also accused the Ottomans of fighting ideas and knowledge and of promoting the worst people, in ethics and in knowledge (Tahan 2002:157-161).

The reason for [Muslims’] retreat is the change that occurred in Islamic politics. They [the Muslim regimes] used to be completely representative (or democratic). Then, they became, after [the death of] the righteous [caliphs] and as a result of internal fighting [over power], kingdoms that are restricted by the main principles of religion. Then they became seemingly non-restricted kingdoms (Tahan 2002:56).

Regarding the ethics of the Muslim masses, Kawakibi was very critical of the ethical and moral status of his contemporary Muslims. He criticized them for being used to ignorance and for being hopeless. He accused them of being lazy, of becoming disinterested in advising or helping each other, and of being unwilling to stand up and fight for their freedoms and rights.

Tyranny affects many human inclinations and good ethics by weakening them, by corrupting them, and by obliterating them. [Tyranny] makes the individual ungrateful for the bounties of his Lord because he cannot actually own these bounties to really thank the Lord for them. [Tyranny] makes the individual hate his people because they support oppression. [Tyranny makes the individual] lose his love of his home country because he cannot be sure about its stability. This makes him [the individual] wish to leave it [his home country]. [Tyranny] weakens the individual’s love of his family because he becomes unsure about how long his relationship with them can last. [Tyranny] weakens the individual’s trust in the friendship of his loved ones because he knows that they are like him. …[They] could be forced to harm their friend or to even kill him while crying. The captive of tyranny does not own anything … because he does not own any money that is not subject to be stolen [by the tyrant] or any honor that is not subject to be violated [by the tyrant]. (Tahan 2003:133)


In response to these problems, Kawakibi supported the idea of gradual change. “Tyranny,” Kawakibi thought, “cannot be resisted by force, but it can be resisted by soft power and gradualism” (Tahan 2003:210). He believed that Muslim societies were not ready for democratic governance because many of their populations did not feel the need for freedom or the pain of tyranny. He also thought that Muslims should work on finding alternative leaders and political systems that could replace tyranny before trying to resist the tyrannical regimes and abolish them.

To strengthen Muslim civil societies, Kawakibi advocated the idea of building and spreading European-style organizations of civil society. In this regard, he drafted the bylaws of an international organization of Muslim scholars that should work as a Muslim think-tank that focused on reforming Islamic education and on reforming Muslims’ way of thinking. He thought that such an organization should be non-governmental and non-sectarian. He hoped that this organization would eventually finance scholars and scientific research, publish its own newspapers, and build its own schools. He believed that such an organization should stay away from politics and should seek to achieve reform gradually through reforming education and thinking (Tahan 2002:177-192).

Continuous organizations can support their projects for a long period of time, which can be longer than a person’s life. They can achieve their activities with strong intentions that are not corrupted with hesitation. …This is why organizations can achieve great things and can achieve amazing things. This is the secret of the rise of the European nations. (Tahan 2002:48)

3) Kawakibi’s Occidental Discourse

In the previous sections, I have shown how Kawakibi’s life and view of reform led him to focus on internal reform through educating the new Muslim generations about politics and religion and trying to build new, strong organizations of civil society. He distrusted the role of the masses in reform and stayed away from politically mobilizing them, yet he was careful not to offend the masses’ habits and tradition.

In this section I explain how the previous circumstances and views led Kawakibi to see the West from a particular perspective that was less critical of the effect of Western colonialism on the status of Muslims, looked up to the West as a model for reforming Muslims’ political thinking and civil societies, and was more critical of the West at the social and religious levels.

In this regard, it is important to note that Kawakibi did not speak to multiple audiences. All his writings were written in the Arabic language and were directed toward an Arab audience. It is also important to note that Kawakibi’s discourse was a little bit too sophisticated for the regular Arab and Muslim masses, which were largely uneducated at his time. Therefore, one can say that Kawakibi’s main audience was the educated Arab and Muslim sections of his society.

1. Kawakibi’s View of the Effect of Western Colonialism on the Muslim World

As someone who focused on internal and gradual reform and whose main objective was to reform Muslims’ ways of thinking and to spread freedom and democracy in the Arab world, Kawakibi paid less attention to the relationship between the West and the Muslim world and to the effect this relationship had on the status of Muslim countries and focused more on the internal causes of Muslims’ decline. This fact does not mean that the West was not present in Kawakibi’s writings. Actually, the West was very present throughout the majority of Kawakibi’s writings. But the West as a factor affecting Muslims’ life and circumstances always came second in Kawakibi’s writings to the internal conditions of the Muslim societies themselves. In other words, because Kawakibi’s main audience was Arabs and because his main focus was internal gradual reform, he always gave priority to analyzing the internal factors affecting Muslim societies, especially the role of tyrannical Muslim regimes and the counterproductive influence of the Muslim masses, which were largely ignorant and passive.

In fact, Kawakibi accused Muslim governments of misrepresenting Islam to the West. He believed that Muslim rulers intentionally portrayed Islam to the West as a religion that is not compatible with democracy or with modern political systems in order to use this distorted image of Islam as a justification for their lack of democratization (Tahan 2002:74). He also thought that Western governments were, from the standpoint of Islam, more qualified to govern Muslims than his contemporary Muslim regimes and even believed that Western colonial countries did a better job of understanding and representing the cultures and aspirations of their colonized Muslim people than the Ottomans did in the Arab world (Tahan 2002:162). Therefore, Kawakibi emphasized the importance of “describing the wisdom and tolerance of Islam to the civilized world” (Tahan 2002:117). He believed that Europeans would be easily attracted to Islam because of its rationality. He also called on the West to help the East improve its conditions and reminded the West that Islam had contributed to its progress and civilization (Tahan 2003:189).

In addition, Kawakibi’s socially and religiously conservative agenda led him to be critical of Muslim elites, who mimicked the West at the social and cultural level. Kawakibi considered the Muslim elites to be the most corrupted segments of the Muslim societies. He described them as children in the way they looked up to the West and sought to imitate it. This imitation, according to Kawakibi (Tahan 2002:170,171), led the elites to shy away from defending religion, to look down on their national traditions, and to shy away from wearing their traditional clothing and from defending their own people.

He was also critical of what he called “the Westernized youth.” According to Kawakibi (Tahan 2002:172), the Westernized youth were incapable of keeping from imitating the West “as if they were born followers [of the West].” They also liked Western ideas, such as nationalism. But because they didn’t respect their own traditions, they could only claim to be nationalistic. In reality, Kawakibi thought, Westernized youth didn’t serve or benefit their countries in any way.

On the negative side, Kawakibi believed that Western colonialism only cared about the welfare of Western people and was interested in keeping colonized people weak and dependent on the West. He also believed that colonialism, using British colonialism as an example, tended to encourage the religious differences that existed among the colonized people in order to divide and conquer them (Tahan 2003:63-64). Therefore, he called on his contemporary Muslims not to trust Western colonialism. He even called on the Jews and Christians who lived in the East to consider themselves Easterners and not to trust the West:

The Westerner knows how to lead, how to enjoy, how to enslave, and how to own. When he sees you [Easterners] ready to match him [in power] or to be ahead of him, he will pressure your minds to keep you way behind. …The Westerner, regardless of how long he stays in the East, in not more than a trader seeking pleasure. He will take the plants of the East and plant them in his country, which he is proud of.

The Dutch people spent in India and its islands, and the Russians spent in the Caspian, as long as we [Muslims] spent in Andalusia. Yet they did not serve science and civilization with one tenth of what had been done for them [in Andalusia]. The French entered Algeria seventy years ago and they did not allow its people [to publish] a single readable newspaper. We see the British, in our country, prefer the food of his country and the fish of his seas over the best meat and fish that we have. And if this is the case, cannot you listeners [Easterners] understand? (Tahan 2003:187)


2. Kawakibi’s View of the West as a Model at the Intellectual, Political, and Civil Levels

When speaking about the West itself, Kawakibi was more positive than negative. On the positive side, Kawakibi appreciated the political life of the West. He praised European and American political scholars for expanding and improving political knowledge. “The people of Europe and America,” Kawakibi commended, “have expanded these [political] sciences, and written a lot about them, and in detail. Some of them have even written big volumes about small branches of it [political science]. They organized its branches into public policy, foreign policy, public administration, political economy, and political rights … etc.” (Tahan 2003:46). He praised some European thinkers, such as Montesquieu and Voltaire, for reforming the thinking of their people and for standing up to political authority. He also praised some European rulers, such as Napoleon Bonaparte, as great leaders who achieved great things because of their “truthful intentions” and because of their representation and nearness to the ideas, hopes, and traditions of their people (Tahan 2002:162). He even went as far as to suggest that Western rulers were more qualified, from the standpoint of Islam, to govern Muslims than his contemporary Muslim monarchs, who were in his opinion corrupt and unjust.

Religion and logic rule that the kings of the foreigners [Europeans] are more qualified than they [contemporary Muslim rulers] and more deserving to rule Muslims. This is because they [the Western rulers] are nearer to justice and to achieving the public good. They are more qualified to build [our] country and to help people. This is why Allah has stripped many of them [the contemporary Muslim rulers] of their kingdoms. (Tahan 2002:62)


In addition, Kawakibi praised socialism several times. He saw it as a better way to distribute wealth between members of society. He commended how some socialist Westerners lived in communist groups, where wealth was divided equally among all members and where all members had the same rights and standards of life. Kawakibi also believed that socialism was closer to Islam because of its emphasis on equality (Tahan 2002:80).

The politicians who have socialist and moral principles believe that the negative effect of private wealth on the general public of nations is more than the positive effect. This is because [private wealth] empowers domestic tyranny by dividing people into two categories: slaves and masters. And it [private wealth] empowers foreign tyranny and makes it easier for rich nations to violate the freedom and independence of weaker nations. (Tahan 2003:124)

At the level of civil society, Kawakibi commended the West for having strong organizations of civil society, which he attempted to spread in the Muslim world and considered to be the secret behind the progress of the Western nations (Tahan 2002:48). He felt that Western societies had a more organized social life that helped connect Western individuals with each other and that helped increase Westerners’ feelings of social integration and their desire to relate to and work with each other. In this regard, Kawakibi praised the West for having unified holidays and weekends, when people could get together and hold meetings, discussions, and conferences. He commended the West for having organized public places and clubs, where people could easily meet to socialize or even to demonstrate. He also praised the West for having theaters, parks, monuments, daily newspapers, and national songs and memorials. He saw all of these features as positive means that could help the people of each nation relate to and work with each other (Tahan 2002:82-83).

At the intellectual level, Kawakbi saw Westerners as rational people, who didn’t follow ideas before understanding them. He also gave the impression that the West could help reform the Muslim world through Western Muslims, who understood Islam in a new, enlightened way that combined the positive aspects of both Islam and Western rationality.

He believed that Western sciences proved many of the scientific notions that exist in the Quran and that Muslims could not understand before because of their weak understanding of the natural sciences (Tahan 2002:77, Tahan 2003:80). He considered Protestantism to be a more rational religion than Catholicism, which overemphasizes the role of the church and priesthood. He believed that Protestants and atheists were more sympathetic to Islam and Muslims and were more ready to convert to Islam because of their rejection of some of the irrational notions of Catholicism.

Our hope is to guide [to Islam] two groups; the first is from the Protestants and the second is from the atheists. We have hope in the Protestants because they have recently left Catholicism because they rather focus on the Bible and the texts of the holy books. [They also] reject the explanations, interpretations, and additions that have no clear source in the Bible. The Protestants in Europe and America are more than one hundred million and they are all religious by nature. They are not stubborn in their beliefs. They are willing to search for and follow the truth if it can be shown to them in a clear rational way.

The second group is the atheists who totally left Christianity because of its incompatibility with reason. They are, in Europe and in America, more than one hundred million. The majority of them are ready to accept a religion that is rational, free, and tolerant and that can relieve them from the hardship of disbelief in current life and from punishment in the hereafter. What is strange, if you look carefully, [is that] the more the people of this group stay away from Christianity. … they get, of course, closer to the ones of God [Islam] and of the Islamic religion. (Tahan 2002:116-117)


He also spoke proudly and positively about Western Muslims, Westerners who converted to Islam. He portrayed Western Muslims as educated people who lived in countries like Russia and Britain, and who liked Islam because of its rationality. Kawakibi believed that Western Muslims believed in a pure version of Islam, which he considered to be the solution to Muslims’ problems. This pure version focused on Islam’s main texts, especially the Quran and the traditions of the Prophet Mohamed, and rejected overburdening Muslims with too many and sometimes contradictory schools of Islamic thought that dominated the lives of contemporary Muslims and overburdened them with too many religious rulings, which they could not understand or follow. Kawakibi hoped that Western Muslims could spread Islam in the West, especially among Protestants and atheists, and could reform Islam and the Muslim world.

I see that the coming century will not pass before the numbers of the Occidentalists [Westerners] who believe in Islam increase and before they become more rooted in Islam. They will take the task of freeing the Islamic law [from the wrong beliefs that dominate the thinking of contemporary Muslims] and then spread it among all humanity. …And a day will come when the Prince Mohamed, the Russian or the British, for instance, will stand as the Imam and he will return the glory of Islam in the most complete system (Tahan 2002:143).

3. Kawakibi’s View of the West at the Religious and Social Levels.

At the religious level, Kawakibi briefly praised Christians and Jews as people of pure intentions and natures who don’t deny the existence of God and who know God because of their pure and clean innate nature (Tahan 2002:93).

On the negative side, Kawakibi was repeatedly critical of Christianity and of Judaism, and he occasionally used some Quraniq verses to prove his criticism of the two religions. For example, Kawakibi quoted the Quraniq verse that says: “they [Jews and Christians] took their rabbis and their monks to be their lords besides Allah” (Quran: 9:30) to prove the idea that Christians and Jews had corrupted their religions by adding to it too many extra ideas and practices. In contrast, he praised Protestantism and saw it as a response to and a solution for the problems of Catholicism.

He also believed that religion had no effect on the life of European nations (Tahan 2003:187). “If religion has an effect on the Westerner,” Kawakibi stated, “animosity would not have existed between the Latins and the Saxons, between the Italians and the French, and between the Germans and the French” (Tahan 2003:187).

At the social level, Kawakibi described Westerners as people who “don’t care about anything but to expand in materialism and in desires” (Tahan 2002:169). He criticized the high status that women had in Western civilization. He suggested that European civilization should be called “a female civilization” because “[Western] men have become like cattle [owned by] their women” (Tahan 2003:116). In this regard, it is important to note that Kawakibi held some negative attitudes toward women, whom he considered to be less ethically capable than men (Tahan 2002:169).

When it came to social justice, Kawakibi accused Europe of being unjust in distributing wealth among its citizens, which created a very poor European class. “Many people in civilized Europe, especially in London and Paris,” Kawakibi said, “don’t have a space where they can sleep while stretching [their bodies]. They sleep in the lower levels of buildings, where cows would not sleep” (Tahan 2003:122).

In addition to these negative images, Kawakibi wrote some of his most anti-Western views in a long comparison that he wrote between the Western individual and the Easterner. In this regard, Kawakibi created a sharp duality in which the Westerner was described as a materialistic, stubborn, free, realistic, and less religious individual. In contrast, the Easterner was described as a kinder, soft-hearted, less free, and more idealistic individual. Although some of the images that Kawakibi used to describe the Western individual were not negative, the bi-polar categorization system that he used to compare Easterners and Westerners put the two groups in sharp opposition to each other.

The Westerner: [is] materialistic in his life, with strong will, tough in his dealings [with people], persistent in taking revenge, as if he does not have any of the high values and honorable emotions that Eastern Christianity has transferred to him. The German man for example [is] dry in his character. He sees that weak humans deserve death and sees every virtue in power and sees every power in money. Therefore, he loves knowledge, but for the sake of money. And he loves glory, but for the sake of money.

However, the people of the Orient are idealistic; they are more subject to the weakness of the heart, to the power of love, to the voices of their emotions, to a tendency to mercy even if it is in the wrong place, to using kindness even with the enemy. They see honor in power and in helping the needy. [They see] wealth in satisfaction and virtue.

The Easterner should not walk with the Westerner in the same path. His [the Easterner’s] character is not going to let him enjoy what the Westerner enjoys. If he [the Easterner] tries to imitate the Westerner, the Easterner is not going to do a good job.

There are so many differences between Easterners and Westerners. …For example, Westerners take an oath from the ruler that he will be truthful in his service and that he will obey the law, while the Eastern sultan takes an oath from his people that they will follow and obey. Westerners give their rulers what they don’t need from their wealth, while the princes of the Easterners give whoever they want what is supposed to be the people’s money as if it is a charity. The Westerner considers himself an owner of a part of his country, while the Easterner considers himself and his siblings and what he owns [as property] as owned by his prince. The Westerner has rights on his prince and he has no obligations to him, while the Easterner has obligations to his prince but has no rights. Westerners put laws for their prince to follow, while Easterners follow the laws of their prince’s desires. Westerners get their destiny from God, while Easterners get their destiny from what the lips of the masters say. The Easterner believes everything quickly, while the Westerner does not believe or negate anything before seeking proof. The Westerner cares the most about his freedom and independence, while the Easterner cares most about religion and about showing off about his religion. The Westerner cares about power, honor, and about more of them. In conclusion: the Easterner is the son of the past and of the imagination, while the Westerner is the son of the future and of seriousness. (Tahan 2003:146,148)

The previous paragraphs show how Kawakibi’s life and view of reform led him to view the West ambivalently and selectively both as a threat to and a model for Muslims’ reform. Kawakibi’s interest in internal reform and his concern with the authoritarianism of the Ottomans led him to pay little attention to the negative effects of Western colonialism on the Muslim world. At the same time, Kawakibi looked up to the West as a model for reform at the political, intellectual, and societal levels. However, Kawakibi’s socially conservative agenda led him to criticize the West at the religious and social levels while neglecting the interdependence between the various aspects of Western civilizations. In other words, Kawakibi’s agenda led him to praise some aspects of Western civilization selectively and simultaneously to criticize others, without explaining the relationships and interconnectedness of these various aspects that belong to the same civilization.

4) Kawakibi’s View of America

Throughout his writings, Kawakibi spoke positively about America, using four main images.

First, he spoke about America as a source of hope for the Muslim world because America empowered itself and gained independence after it was weak and colonized (Tahan 2002:47).

Second, Kawakibi (Tahan 2003:55-56) spoke about Americans as a nationalistic people, who knew who to strike a balance between their love of their country and their personal freedom and independence. In this regard, Kawakibi described Americans’ attachment to their country as a feeling of participation in a voluntary association. In contrast, he believed that Muslims were too attached to their countries and less free. He also believed that America was the only country at his time where freedom “has reached its utmost” (Tahan 2002:100). In addition, he spoke positively about America as an example of a united country that had used science and knowledge to build strong national unity despite its religious and administrative diversity.

Science has guided America in several ways and strong principles to build its national unity without religious unity, its racial harmony without ideological [harmony], its political unity without administrative [unity]. (Tahan 2003:186)

At the religious level, Kawakibi praised America’s Protestants and atheists, as he believed that they were more rational and more willing to understand and accept Islam if they were presented with a clear explanation of Islam that showed Islam’s rationality and truthfulness (Tahan 2002:116-117, t, 65).

5) The Role of Islam in Kawakibi’s Occidental Discourse

Kawakibi did not believe in the existence of a religious war between the Muslim world and the West. He believed that some Christian religious groups, naming the Vatican (Tahan 2002:212), didn’t like Muslims to unite or to become powerful. However, he made clear that those who believed in such ideas were the minority in the West and that the majority of the “politicians in Britain, Russia, and France” didn’t think that way. He thought that the majority in the West saw Muslims and Arabs positively. He also believed that Muslims had not launched any religious wars against Europe since the Eleventh Century, arguing that the Turkish wars on Europe were not religious wars. He believed that the Turks did not launch their wars because of religion even if they had used religion as a justification or as a means to mobilize their Muslim followers (Tahan 2002:213).

In addition, Kawakibi accused Muslim governments of using a dual discourse on Islam, one for Europe and one for Muslims. He believed that Muslim rulers used religion as a means to mobilize and manipulate Muslims domestically. At the same time, Muslim regimes portrayed Islam negatively to the West and used this portrayal to justify their inability to democratize or to develop their countries. In the meantime, Kawakibi praised Western sciences and saw Westerners as rational people who were willing to accept Islam if they were presented with a rational and pure version of Islam. Thus, Kawakibi encouraged his contemporary Muslims to reform their understanding of Islam and to present the West with this reformed version.

On the other side, Kawakibi spoke about Christianity and Judaism negatively several times, in a way that can sound offensive to many Westerners. For example, he accused Jews of corrupting their religion, and he described Christianity as a religion that is based on a silly and irrational myth, the concept of the Trinity. He believed that the concept of the Trinity had led the “civilized world” to consider “belonging to” Christianity “as [something] dishonorable” (Tahan 2003:173,174).

6) Conclusion: Main Characteristics of Kawakibi’s Occidental Discourse

In these concluding remarks, I would like to highlight some of the key characteristics of Kawakibi’s Occidental discourse.

First, Kawakibi’s negative experience with the Ottomans led him to focus on resisting them more than on resisting colonialism and to focus on calling for internal reform more than on calling for independence from Western hegemony.

Second, Kawakibi devoted his life and writings to reforming Muslims’ circumstances. In this regard, Kawakibi was pessimistic about the possibility of achieving quick reform. He saw reform as a long-term, gradual process that should start internally by educating the new generations and by building strong organizations of civil society. Kawakibi did not trust the masses and was not interested in mobilizing them to achieve quick change or reform. Yet he himself was socially conservative and he thought that reformers should not be very critical of the masses and should respect the masses’ habits and traditions even if they were outdated and useless.

Third, the role of the West, both as a threat to or as a model for reform in the Muslim world, always came second in Kawakibi’s thinking to the role of Muslims and their governments.

Fourth, Kawakibi’s experience and reform agenda led him to view the West ambivalently and selectively both as a threat to and a model for Muslim reform. He saw the West as a model at the intellectual, political, and social levels. In contrast, he was critical of the West at the social and religious levels. In doing so, Kawakibi used some distinct discourse tactics.

For example, Kawakibi neglected the relationship between the social and religious values of the West and its political and intellectual ideas and social organizations. He selectively chose to praise Western politics and intellectual life while criticizing Western social and religious values, without explaining the interconnectedness between the various aspects of Western civilization.

In addition, Kawakibi was clearly selective in the way he looked at certain aspects of Western civilization. For instance, he praised Western sciences for proving the truthfulness of some Quraniq verses that deal with nature. Yet he overlooked the fact that some of the Western sciences were based on secular and sometimes atheistic premises. In a similar example, Kawakibi defended religion in general, but he spoke positively about Western atheists and believed that they could be easily attracted to Islam, without explaining the reasons behind his belief and without talking about or criticizing some of the anti-religious attitudes that atheists might have.

Moreover, Kawakibi exaggerated the ability of Islam to spread in the West and the ability of Western Muslims to gain power and reform Islam and the Muslim world quickly.

It is also important to point out that Kawakibi’s comparison between Western and Eastern individuals was very polarizing. Kawakibi saw the Westerner as a selfish, materialistic individual, who only cares about the interests of his own people. In contrast, Kawakibi portrayed the Eastern individual as a more idealistic, emotional person, who cares about the goodness of others.

Fifth, Kawakibi looked up to America as a country that gained independence and strength after it was weak and colonized. In this way he associated America with the Muslim world. He also looked at America as the place where Western ideals, such as freedom and the independence of the individual, reached their utmost. In addition, Kawakibi liked America at the religious level because he thought that America had many Protestants and atheists. Kawakibi thought that Protestants and atheists were more rational and moderate people, who were more ready and prepared to accept Islam if they were presented with a pure and rational version of Islam.

Finally, Kawakibi did not think that Europe’s policies toward Muslims were based on religion. He thought that Western policies were based on materialistic and political reasons. He encouraged Muslims to engage in religious dialogue with Westerners and to present them with a new, pure and rational version of Islam. He also saw the spread of Islam in the West as a source of hope for Muslims, as he hoped that Western Muslims could one day gain enough knowledge and power to reform the Muslim world.

Yet Kawakibi’s contrast between Islam on one hand and Christianity and Judaism one the other hand was concerning. This is because Kawakibi repeatedly accused Catholics and Jews of corrupting their religions. He also used some Quraniq verses to justify his opinion. In this regard it is true that Kawakibi was mainly critical of Catholicism and he was supportive of Protestantism, but this does not negate the fact that some of his ideas about Catholics and Jews were negative, especially that he used Quraniq verses to justify his critical views of Catholics and Jews without putting those Quraniq verses in the context in which they were revealed, which referred to specific groups and incidents. In addition, one can argue that Kawakibi was not supportive of Protestantism in itself, but supported it because it was closer to his ideal understanding of Islam. In other words, it can be argued that Kawakibi supported Protestantism only because he thought that Protestantism brought Christians closer to Islam. In conclusion, Kawakibi’s views of Christianity and Judaism are concerning because they could be used as a foundation for anti-Western religious views.