In this concluding chapter, I would like to highlight some of the main characteristics of the Occidental discourses used by Jamal Al-Din Al-Afghani, Qasim Amin, and Abd Al-Rahman Al-Kawakibi to shape Arabs’ views of America and the West at the end of the nineteenth century in Egypt. These characteristics, if taken as a whole, should constitute a valuable and comprehensive framework for understanding the historical roots of Arab Occidentalism and for helping researchers and policy makers understand and address Arab Occidentalism today.
First, the Occidental views of the three writers show that modern Arab Occidentalism can be best understood as part of an overarching discourse on Arab reform and awakening. Such discourse, the study shows, has dominated Arabs’ thinking since the beginning of the nineteenth century, when Arabs and Muslims confronted the weakness of their civilization in comparison to the West.
In response, Muslim governments, and the Egyptian regimes in particular, launched several attempts to reform their societies. In Egypt these reform attempts started as early as 1805, when Mohamed Ali took over Egypt. Though Mohamed Ali was successful in transforming Egypt into a regional military and economic power in a short period of time, Egypt’s search for reform began to fail after the 1840s, when several European countries united with the Ottoman Empire to put an end to the rise of Egypt’s power. Egypt’s search for reform also failed because it could not open up its political system, which was generally oppressive and authoritarian. It also failed in improving the circumstances of the great majority of the Egyptian masses, who remained largely poor, ignorant, and politically weak as political and economic power were concentrated in the hands of a small Turkish ruling elite. Despite Mohamed Ali’s defeat and despite the shortcomings of Egypt’s successive governments, Egypt remained a major intellectual center in the Arab world, to which major Arab and Muslim intellectuals immigrated to live and spread their ideas.
In this context Afghani, Kawakibi, and Qasim Amin, despite their wide ideological differences, devoted most of their writings to counseling their fellow Muslim and Arab readers on how to reform their thinking and circumstances.
Second, The Arab Occidentalism of the three writers was not a neutral reflection of the reality or even of the information each intellectual had about the West. Instead, these Arab and Muslim intellectuals tended to manipulate the information they had about the West in order to serve higher goals, namely, their reform agendas. The study highlighted some common manipulative techniques used by the three writers.
The first of these techniques was double discourse, which was used by Afghani and Qasim Amin, who used one discourse when addressing Westerners and another one when addressing their Muslim audience. Afghani’s Occidental discourse when addressing Europeans was more positive about the West than when addressing Egyptians. In contrast, Amin’s Occidental discourse when addressing Europeans was more negative than when addressing Egyptians. Both Afghani and Amin, when addressing Egyptians, emphasized certain information they had about the West that could serve their agendas and downplayed other images that could hurt their goals.
The second manipulative technique was selectivity, which was repeatedly used by Kawakibi, who praised some aspects of Western civilization and criticized others without explaining the relationship and interconnectivity among aspects that belonged to the same civilization. For instance, Kawakibi praised Western political thinking while criticizing Western foreign policies, without showing the relationship between those ideas and the policies they might have produced.
Qasim Amin also chose to neglect certain issues that heavily hindered the progress of the Muslim world but did not fit his interests. For instance, He considered authoritarianism to be the main source of Muslims’ problems, but he chose not to address it. Similarly, Amin encouraged Muslims to mimic Europe’s cultural and social habits, but he did not pay attention to the fact that Muslims were weaker than Europeans, which led to the cultural hegemony of Europe over Egypt and the Arab world.
The third manipulative technique was exaggeration. Afghani exaggerated the weakness of British soldiers and the willingness of Egyptians to revolt against them in order to encourage Muslims to revolt against the British. Because these images were exaggerated, Afghani’s predictions and hopes fell short and he always felt disappointed.
Kawakibi exaggerated the ability of Islam to spread in the West and the ability of Western Muslims to gain power and reform the East. He thought that Westerners, especially Protestants and atheists, would be more willing to convert to Islam, and he hoped that Western Muslims would be able in a century to gain enough power to reform and empower the Muslim world. Kawakibi built these predictions on his personal observations, which he did not support with any scientific facts. Both images appear today to have been exaggerated.
In addition to the previous manipulative techniques, the three writers used binary opposition systems to describe the relationship between the East and the West. The most common and most negative of these binaries dealt with the image of the Western individual versus the image of the Eastern individual. The Western individual was portrayed as materialistic, selfish, tough, realistic, rational, free, independent, stubborn, arrogant, greedy, deceptive, unwilling to admit his mistakes, controlled and motivated by his desires and ambitious. The Westerner was also described as one who is not ethical by nature, but as someone who does not transgress because of his fear of the law.
In contrast, Easterners were described as kinder, emotional, irrational, sensitive, caring about others, shy, dependent, humble, direct and simple, generous, and brave by nature, yet unwilling to defend their rights or their opinions even if they felt that they were right.
Qasim Amin was the only writer among the three who encouraged his readers to learn more about the West and discouraged them from rushing to judgment and from making broad generalizations about the West and Westerners.
Third, the writers viewed the West in an ambivalent way. In other words, none of the three writers saw the West in a totally negative or in an entirely positive way. They all saw the West simultaneously as an obstacle against and a model for reform. They appreciated some aspects of Western civilization and criticized others.
Fourth, four main factors determined the way each intellectual viewed and spoke about reform and the West.
The first factor was the relationship between the European and the Muslim countries. The three writers saw Western colonialism as a threat to the reform and awakening of the Muslim world. Therefore, they all viewed Western foreign policies negatively.
The second factor was the willingness of each writer to align himself with contemporary Muslim regimes. Here, the study shows that writers such as Afghani, who called upon the Muslim masses to unite with their Muslim governments to reform their circumstances and to resist Western pressures, promoted more anti-Western views than intellectuals who were less interested in politics such as Qasim Amin, or who refused to work with the tyrannical Muslim governments, like Kawakibi. This is because authoritarian regimes fight internal critics and divert intellectuals’ attention to criticizing the West.
The third factor was the attitudes of each intellectual toward the conservative agenda of the Muslim masses. Intellectuals who challenged the socially and culturally conservative agenda of the Muslim masses, such as Qasim Amin, had more liberty to praise the West at the social and cultural levels. On the other hand, writers such as Kawakibi and Afghani, who felt that challenging the conservative agenda of the Muslim masses hurt reform, spoke more negatively about the West at the social and cultural levels.
The fourth factor was the way each writer saw the process of reform itself. Here the study shows that writers such as Qasim Amin and Kawakibi, who saw reform as a gradual, educational, and evolutionary process, were more likely to hold pro-Western views. On the other hand, Afghani, who promoted a political and revolutionary view of reform, resorted to more negative views of the West because of his inclination to agitate Muslims to revolt against British colonialism.
Fifth, the study identified that the forms of Occidental discourse employed by the three writers differed considerably and responded to their unique circumstances and interests.
The first discourse, used by Jamal Al-Din Al-Afghani, developed during a period, the 1870s, that witnessed increasing European pressures on Egypt. In response, Afghani saw himself as an intellectual and political reformer and wanted to use his intellectual and political skills to mobilize the Muslim masses and governments to revolt against the British incursions in the Arab and Muslim worlds. This goal led Afghani to focus on portraying the West as a threat to the Muslim world and to deemphasize any positive information he had about the West.
The second discourse, used by Qasim Amin, developed during a period, the 1890s, during which Egypt enjoyed relatively more political freedoms. In addition, Amin himself was not interested in politics or in mobilizing the masses. He saw himself as an intellectual interested in educating the young and future Egyptian generations. Amin also believed that reform should start from inside the Muslim family itself. He focused on criticizing the social and cultural traditions of Egyptian society and was willing to challenge some of the most powerful social taboos of his time, especially regarding the role of women in society. These convictions led Amin to look up to Europe as a model for social and cultural reform and to downplay any critiques he had about Western colonialism.
The third discourse, used by Abd Al-Rahman Al-Kawakibi, was highly influenced by Kawakibi’s strong negative attitudes against the Ottoman Empire. Kawakibi was also pessimistic about the Muslim masses and their ability to change their own circumstances. In response, Kawakibi saw reform as a long-term, gradual process that should start internally. He disliked the idea of mobilizing the masses to achieve quick transformations. Yet Kawakibi himself was socially conservative and he thought that reformers should not blame the masses and should show respect to the masses’ habits and traditions. These beliefs led Kawakibi to introduce the West as a model for political and intellectual reform that should be mimicked. At the same time, Kawakibi mocked the West at the social and religious levels.
Sixth, America was less present in the writings of the three writers compared with Europe as an entity and with major European nations, such as France and Britain, which had a history of intervention in the Muslim world.
America was more present in the writings of Qasim Amin and Kawakibi than in the writings of Afghani, who belonged to a generation that was slightly older than the generation of the other two thinkers. This may mean that Egyptians in particular and Arabs in general started to learn more about the United States in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.
In general, the three writers looked at America as a new and better West for two main reasons. First, America was seen as a country that was occupied by Europeans and that revolted and fought hard to gain its independence from unjust European colonialism. This image was clearly expressed in the writings of Afghani and Kawakbi. In this respect, America was clearly associated with the Arab and Muslim people and was introduced as a model in resisting colonialism that should be imitated. Second, America was seen as the place where Western values, such as freedom, independence, love of work, education, good treatment of women and children, religious tolerance, diversity, national unity, and democracy, reached their utmost expression.
On the other side, Amin, who was the only Western-educated thinker among the three, provoked two negative images of America. First, Amin saw America as a colonial country that was built on the ruins of its native people. Second, Amin criticized America as one of the few modern countries that approved slavery.
I would also argue that the three writers saw America in ways that served their own agendas. Afghani, who wanted to encourage Muslims to revolt against the British, emphasized America as a county that was colonized and unjustly treated by the British. However, Amin, who wanted to encourage Muslims to mimic the West socially and culturally, described America as the place where Western values reached their utmost. In other words, the three writers looked at America selectively to serve their agenda. This led them to use America sometimes as an argument against the West and other times as an argument for the glory of Western civilization.
Seventh, religion in general and Islam in particular were clearly present in the writings of the three thinkers. In this regard, none of the three writers believed in the presence of a religious war between the Muslim world and the West. The three writers believed that Western policies toward the Muslim world were mainly based on economic and political interests. They did not think that Western governments were motivated by religion, nor did they think that Muslim governments were motivated by Islam. They hoped for more opportunities to dialogue with Westerners and to explain to them the true nature of Islam. Even Afghani, who used religion to motivate Muslims against the British, was willing to dialogue with Westerners and used a more open discourse when addressing them. Kawakibi thought that Muslim governments constituted a serious obstacle that hindered Muslim scholars’ efforts to dialogue with Westerners.
The previous positive views, if promoted today, should provide a powerful alternative against those who promote a religious war between Islam and the West.
On the other hand, religion played a negative role in shaping the Occidental views of the three writers for the following reasons:
First, Afghani used religion as a means to motivate Muslims against British colonialism, although he strongly believed that Western policies were not motivated by religion. He described the British colonizers as people who had deep animosity toward Islam and Muslims and who tended to discriminate against Muslims on religious bases. Therefore, he urged Muslims to revolt against the British to defend their religion and their targeted and discriminated Muslim brothers. Though Afghani knew that religion was not the main basis for the conflict between the West and the Muslim world, he still used religion to motivate Muslims against the British occupation.
Second, the three thinkers looked at Islam as a perfect religion that is superior to Christianity and Judaism and to modern Western legal systems. One can argue that they were only expressing their religious beliefs in Islam and that they did not intend to offend non-Muslims. On the other hand, this does not deny the fact that the three thinkers held negative views of Christianity and Judaism, and their views could be used by their audience as a basis for anti-Western religious attitudes.
Policy Implications
I have mentioned in my introduction that this thesis pays special attention to the policy implications of its findings. In this regard, I make the following policy-oriented recommendations. First, I would urge policy makers to learn more about Arab Occidentalism, its roots, and the main factors shaping it. Based on this study and on the framework presented in the previous paragraphs of this conclusion, any serious effort to improve Arabs’ views of the West should simultaneously target the four following challenges, which reflect the four main factors shaping the Occidental discourses studied by this thesis:
(1) The first challenge is to work to improve Western foreign policies toward the Muslim world. This is because the writers studied consistently saw Western foreign polices as a source of negative views about the West.
(2) Spreading democracy and fighting authoritarianism and tyranny in the Arab and Muslim worlds should help improve the West’s image by giving Arab and Muslim intellectuals the freedom to study and criticize the circumstances of their societies instead of diverting most of their attention to criticizing the West.
(3) The Arab masses in general and the Muslim masses in particular need to be educated about the social and cultural values of the West. In this regard, the study shows that Arabs tend to see the West negatively at the social and moral levels.
(4) Spreading an image of reform as a gradual, evolutionary, educational process should help to improve the way Arabs view the West and Westerners. This kind of view should help Arabs appreciate more the West as a model for reform at many levels.
Second, I recommend using the four policy recommendations outlined above to evaluate the major policy approaches implemented by Western governments in the post- 9/11 era to improve their relations with the Arab world. As examples, I would suggest the following:
- The US administration’s efforts to promote democracy in the Arab world should be encouraged. Such efforts, if they succeed, should give Arab intellectuals more opportunity to study and criticize their own circumstances freely instead of focusing most of their attention on criticizing the West because of their inability to focus on the internal problems of their societies. However, such efforts should be mixed with a serious and intense effort to educate Arabs about reform as a gradual, educational process. This is because pushing for change as a value in itself can lead some Arab groups to attempt to bring reform through violent means. This leads me to the following recommendation.
- There is an urgent need to promote a view of healthy reform as a gradual, education, internal, non-violent process. This can happen through the new Arabic Radio and TV stations launched by the US administration after 9/11, through writings and educational seminars, and through US officials’ meetings with Arab and Muslim groups. In this regard, the US should highlight the difference between change that can lead to negative or positive, peaceful or violent, permanent or temporary results and between reform that should start from inside by transforming Arabs’ understanding of their circumstances in a positive way that should lead to more fruitful, peaceful, and permanent results. Seeking change as a value in itself could lead to catastrophic results. Only reform that is based on educating and transforming large segments of Arab societies can lead to more peaceful and prosperous Arab realities and to improving Arab perceptions of the West.
- The US should put more resources and efforts into educating the Arab world about the moral and social values of the American people. Putting too much emphasis on the political and economic aspects of the relationship between America and the Arab world is not sufficient. Instead, the United States should use its communication channels with the Arab world to educate Arabs about the social and moral values of the American people. In this regard, America should not seek to present itself as a perfect nation, as all human societies have their weaknesses. However, America should highlight its diversity, multi-culturalism, work ethic, freedoms, and many other major values.
- The US should not delay dealing with major issues affecting its relationship with the Arab world, especially the Arab-Israeli peace process. Delaying the peace process does not serve America’s interests and will not improve its image.
- Finally, the US should abstain from any policy similar to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 for the following reasons. The invasion of an Arab country will lead Arabs to perceive America as a colonial power in the same way they perceived the European colonial powers. Such perceptions are deeply rooted in the Arab mind. They are also a universal source of negative perception for the majority of Arabs, even the most pro-Western among them. Second, invasion and other forms or radical violent change push Arab groups to believe in radicalism and violence as tools for reform. Such beliefs, as explained before, should lead to anti-Western views and delay real reform.
Before concluding this book, I would urge students and scholars of Arab Occidentalism to investigate further the roots of Arab Occidentalism. There is a need to study and compare the Occidental views of more thinkers to understand fully the various dimensions of Egyptian and Arab Occidentalism. There is also a need to study the Occidental views of more Arab writers who lived at various times to be able to gain better understanding of the various aspects of Arab Occidentalism.
In addition, there is a major need to study other sources of Occidental views and discourse, especially governments, mass media organizations, and religious institutions. This is because any common discourse depends on a variety of resources and support to spread. Governments, religious and educational institutions, and mass media organizations are all contributors to the discourse. They are capable of spreading certain Occidental discourses more than single thinkers can. Therefore, there is a need to study the Occidental discourses developed by such organizations in Arab societies in order to develop a better understanding of Arab Occidentalism. I personally hope to pursue such research in the future.
Finally, although it may be difficult to determine how much influence Jamal Al-Din Al-Afghani, Qasim Amin, and Abd Al-Rahman Al-Kawakibi, have on Arab Occidentalism today, it is important to note that the three writers were more open to learning from the West than many of today’s Arab and Muslim intellectuals. In this regard, they rejected the idea that a religious war existed between Islam and the West; and they encouraged their readers to learn from the West at the intellectual and political levels.
On the other hand, they reflected some of the same negative images that Arabs have about the West today. In this regard, the three writers saw the Western individual as selfish, materialistic, and less kind. They did not have an appreciation of Western societies at the moral and social levels. In addition, some of them, especially Afghani, opened the door to using religion as a tool to agitate Muslims against the West. At the end of this study, I hope that readers and researchers alike can help promote the positive Occidental views adopted by Afghani, Qasim Amin, and Kawakibi and at the same time can help change negative views through the approaches their writings suggest.
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